無盡藏分院共修

聯合國際世界佛教總部公告 (公告字第20170102號)

本總部經過經律論百題書面考和聖考，幫助學佛修行人在世界各地，考鑑出了七個不同級別的師資，為佛教徒分辨上師的師資程度，取得了巨大成就，在佛史上又立下了一里程碑，南無第三世多杰羌佛說：「你總部考核出來的善行師資，但並不一定是本質上的道行成就者。一個為師之人的好壞正邪，應從全面的德行、經教、修為上來考量，善德行人也有知見偏邪的現象，偏邪了，不改是妖人，知錯當下改，說明在修行，總之，眾善行，諸惡莫作，就是好的。」確實如此，現在發現有考不上段位的人，冒稱考上了段位行騙，又有拿到藍釦段位的某些上師，找藉口不穿段位釦裝，這些人暴露出了強盛的凡夫本質世俗面子，根本不是有德有道之師，怕弟子看不起，其實這就是騙子邪師的本質露了形！！！為什麼考到高段位的上師會有騙子邪師呢？這不矛盾嗎？完全不矛盾！這是立聖考規章上的原因，聖考規定「金剛陣」只針對聖者轉世和聖量道行入考，考人基本上都不敢報考，乃至進了考場的人，見到場上前考者現慘狀，辯稱自己道行不夠，當場申請退考。而八風陣不同，可以用單項特長入考，這就猶如一個運動員冠軍，並不是冠軍都是多項運動的強將，游泳冠軍不具射擊冠軍的能力，而射擊冠軍不具舉重冠軍的本事，是以各自的特長所奪得的冠軍。聖考八風陣也是如此，不會全能的。從一些考上段位的著名上師給他們弟子們修學的儀軌課本，就很說明問題，那些為師之人，打的是南無釋迦牟尼佛和H.H.第三世多杰羌佛的佛教傳承，暗地裡卻反其道而行之，自己斷章取經改法，亂寫胡編違背佛教的妖言邪論、無傳承加持力的假儀軌，讓弟子拿來作功課，控制弟子，有的上師知道自己做錯了，作了懺悔改正，佛菩薩會原諒的！有的到今天還裝糊塗，繼續行騙，此類即是妖師無疑，弟子們由於是外行，只看表面身份、名氣大、地位高，就認為遇到了大菩薩，哪知道此類上師初果羅漢都不是，竟然稱尊者，殊不知忠誠騙子師的人早已上當受騙，但是這些邪騙人物為什麼會考到段位呢？因為在入聖考的時候，該人是拿專長功德來入考的，不是拿罪惡妖言報寫文書入考的，所以在專長功德方面，因果不昧，必然獲得行持功德的段位。如果為師者建立了大功德，又能正知正見，依正法修，那就是優秀上師了！！！還要注意：段位高低與邪惡、騙行是無關的。所以行人們要向聯合國際世界佛教總部諮詢一切，才能清楚真實的情況，除了必須觀看任何為師之人的段位釦裝之外，還要拿128條知見印證！！！拿《學佛》一書核對言行！！！方可徹透是正是邪、是騙子師還是妖師，其師言行是否正知正見，大悲利他？只有這樣，行人們才不會上當受騙，也只有這樣才可找到良師學到正法，福慧圓滿解脫無礙！

聯合國際世界佛教總部

2017年1月24日

連結:http://www.ibsahq.org/news_view.php?id=324
https://www.rightheart.org/聯合國際世界佛教總部公告轉載/2017/01/聯合國際世界佛教總部公告字第20170102號/

2017年佛教正心會參與寒士吃飽三十活動

秉持著「大悲行願 無處不現」的精神，本會今年又與人安基金會配合一起投入寒士吃飽三十活動，將  南無第三世多杰羌佛 暨  釋迦世尊所教導的布施、慈悲喜捨等法教落實在生活當中。今年由卓總會長、台北總會黃副會長帶領數位義工，一同到總統府吃飽三十現場付出我們的關懷。

當我們將一張張四臂觀音唐卡送到寒士的手上，聽他們念一句阿彌陀佛！南無觀世音菩薩！看到他們因唸佛號而出現法喜的笑容，由此而種下一顆菩提種子，衷心期盼寒士們能夠轉業轉運，生活好轉，平安吉祥，更希望風調雨順，國泰平安，世界和平，台灣加油!

連結: https://youtu.be/evjfnCuQ48s

https://www.rightheart.org/公益/2017/01/2017年佛教正心會參與寒士吃飽三十活動

2017/01/22崇德護理之家唸佛班

世界日報有关第三世多杰羌佛报导道歉声明 暨 参议院决议第614号表扬世界和平使命团和世界和平奖

有关第三世多杰羌佛报导道歉声明

2015/07/06

今年四月二十一日，旧金山世界日报“南加新闻”版曾刊出有关第三世多杰羌佛的新闻，文章译自南加州一家地方英文媒体。因为截稿时间压力，及校审疏失，刊用此文前，本报未能查证文中提及的有关内容，在此谨向普受信众敬仰、并曾获得美国国会决议表彰的H.H.第三世多杰羌佛，表达诚恳歉意。

本报历来秉持“正派办报”原则，崇信文明世界正义、自由等基本价值理念，在捍卫言论自由与民众知情权同时，尊重宗教信仰自由及一切正常的宗教活动。对于全球各地的宗教迫害事件，尤其是华人地区有违信仰自由的政治干预和打压行为，本报一直尽全力报导并给予谴责。

本着服务读者的宗旨，对于金山湾区各华人宗教团体的活动及信息，本报尽可能及时报导、刊登，以满足各方信众，广结善缘。本报编采团队，恪守新闻从业人员的道德职守，针对上述工作疏失，已做认真检讨，并订定更严格编审流程，防堵类似事件再次发生。在此，谨向国际僧尼总会的指正表达谢意。

根据僧尼总会和信众读者提供的资料，第三世多杰羌佛是“被佛教各教派法王、摄政王及仁波且们一致认证附议的佛教最高领袖”，虽遭迫害打击，但长期服务广大教徒，深受拥戴。第三世多杰羌佛曾获颁“世界和平奖”、“美国总统金牌奖”、“马丁路德金国际服务奖”等多个奖项。美国参议院曾通过决议文，肯定及褒奖第三世多杰羌佛的服务及贡献。

为帮助读者更多认识第三世多杰羌佛，现将美国联邦参议院2012年第614号决议文全文翻译刊出：

参议院决议第614号表扬世界和平使命团和世界和平奖

2012年12月12日

鉴于世界和平使命团是一个按照推动和平、正义、宗教间合作的核心精神而运作的国际组织；

鉴于世界和平奖是世界和平使命团为表扬对和平与人类觉悟作出巨大贡献之个人而颁发的一项声望卓著的奖项；

鉴于世界和平奖的以往获奖人中包括美国总统雷根、印尼总统瓦希德、帕劳总统中村国雄；

鉴于，在2010年，世界和平奖评奖委员会认定H.H.第三世多杰羌佛在极大范围内对整个世界各地社区的人们作出的人道主义的奉献;

鉴于，H.H.第三世多杰羌佛获得过无数奖项，包括基于H.H.第三世多杰羌佛对艺术、医药、道德、佛教、精神领导和对美国社会作出的杰出贡献而由总统亚太裔顾问委员会主席代表布什总统颁发给H.H.第三世多杰羌佛的美国总统金牌奖；

鉴于，在2010年，世界和平奖委员会也认定本杰明．格尔曼（Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman)是向世界的饥饿和滥用及贩运麻醉品斗争的终身人权冠军；

现通过以下决议，本参议院：

(1)表彰世界和平使命团之推动和平、正义、宗教间的合作，及

(2)表扬世界和平奖及世界和平奖的获奖人。

Youtube頻道:

 

附件一：世界日報紙本照片

周永康陳紹基陷害第三世多杰羌佛真相曝光

一提到 H.H.第三世多杰羌佛，在網上看到造謠的文章而不知真實情況的人會說「他是壞人」，因為中國廣東公安早就發佈過「義雲高詐騙案」的《通緝令》，還上報由國家報國際刑警，國際刑警根據中國的要求也發了通緝令，而「義雲高」就是 H.H.第三世多杰羌佛被認證前的俗名。問題是，國際刑警的通緝令已發佈十二年多了，祂為什麼還自由出入國際間沒有被通緝呢？還不應該想一想，是真正犯罪了嗎？多數時間，第三世多杰羌佛就公開在美國，不僅從未躲藏過，還經常公開到各國講學和接待各界人士，甚至親自到美國國會接受「世界和平獎」頒獎，當天就有很多警察在場。國際刑警可以毫不費力將其緝拿歸案，但為什麼各成員國的警察都不行動呢？這背後真相究竟是什麼？

據知情人透露，所謂「義雲高詐騙案」其實是當時正擔任四川省省委書記的周永康和廣東省政法委書記，公安廳廳長陳紹基 (後任廣東省政協主席，因貪污腐化於二○一○年被判死緩) 聯手陷害第三世多杰羌佛編造出的假案。

事件要追溯到一九九九年，當時劉百行、黃曉穗都是第三世多杰羌佛的學生,因香港義雲高大師館發生詐騙，第三世多杰羌佛讓大家成立了檢舉小組，設檢舉箱。黃曉穗求第三世多杰羌佛撤銷檢舉，羌佛不同意。由於詐騙人是黃曉穗，因此她恨之入骨，在檢舉小組成立的第二天，便蒙蔽劉百行等人，誣蔑說羌佛是無惡不作的壞人，三天便關閉了香港大師館，造成了檢舉小組不撤自散。而黃曉穗的乾爹牛某出自四川，當時是中央某部副部長，其兒子牛X與黃曉穗合夥做生意，牛與當時的四川省委書記周永康和廣東貪官陳紹基是直接工作關係，牛某對羌佛懷恨在心，就通達周永康和陳紹基策劃製造了「義雲高詐騙案」。周永康和當時的成都市長李春城分別在迫害文上簽字，強令關閉了成都市計委批准的、由大邑縣政府修建的屬於官方的「義雲高大師館」，私吞了館內陳列的由第三世多杰羌佛提供的第三世多杰羌佛自己創作的一百多張書畫，而且政府沒有任何所需而故意推到了羌佛在中國唯一的房產--位於成都新華西路十九號的住房，不給一分錢賠償，至今那塊處於鬧市中心的地還荒在那裡，未作任何修建。二○○二年六月二十日，深圳公安在陳紹基的指使下，以莫須有的「合同詐騙」為由出具「刑事案件立案報告表」對「義雲高」立案：稱，二○○○年四月義雲高與劉娟簽了合同，將已售出的深圳市吉祥樓盤售賣給劉娟，騙得一．五億元人民幣。深圳公安對劉娟實施了刑訊逼供，並將港商劉百行被其師姐黃曉穗欺詐財產的事情栽贓給「義雲高」。因此整個案件在媒體報導中只有上述兩個「受害人」。儘管二○○二年11月，經香港廉政公署起訴，黃曉穗及其胞弟因將香港義雲高大師館（劉百行的房產）非法抵押給銀行騙貸款，被香港高等法院以詐騙罪分別判刑十一年和七年半，陳紹基主持下的廣東省公安廳明知罪犯是黃曉穗，但不得不服從執行他的上司旨意，照常將其誣陷在羌佛身上，二○○二年底，廣東省公安廳仍發佈《通緝令》通緝「義雲高」，但其說法又與深圳公安局的立案報告書自相矛盾了，稱「從受害群眾手中騙取約六千萬元人民幣的巨額財物」，那到底是深圳公安局說的是真的，還是廣東公安廳說的是真的？這莫須有的「受害群眾」是誰？實無此人，不可笑嗎？

周永康上調北京擔任政法委書記直至政治局常委後，繼續迫害第三世多杰羌佛。二○○四年底，國際刑警組織雖然根據中方申請發出《紅色通緝令》，但就在當時很快就發現案件疑點，因此立即重新立案，展開了為期三年多的詳細調查。國際刑警最後確定這是迫害誣陷羌佛的假案。同時中國有關部門也核查到義雲高無犯罪事實，遂於二○○八年六月十一日主動打報告請求國際刑警撤銷通緝，試想，如果有罪，中國會主動請求撤銷嗎？二○○八年十月在第七十二屆「國際刑警組織文件控制委員會」大會上，通過結論：無罪，國際刑警正式宣佈撤除「義雲高」《通緝令》及整個案件，並正式下文告知全世界各成員國不准留置「義雲高」，國際刑警還專門致函第三世多杰羌佛陳述了經過。

事實真相是，至今為止 H.H.第三世多杰羌佛從未有過任何違法犯罪言行，也沒有任何法院或司法機構對祂做出任何「有罪裁決」。祂於一九九九年八月一日合法應邀抵美講學並合法定居美國後從未回過中國，第三世多杰羌佛在中國沒有成立過任何一個公司，因為羌佛不做任何生意，不但沒有跟劉娟簽過合同、做過買賣，而且退到一萬步，就是想簽也無權簽，因為大吉祥樓盤的公司不是第三世多杰羌佛的，第三世多杰羌佛在該公司沒有任何職務，連員工也不是，而且第三世多杰羌佛沒有跟任何人簽過合同！公安是憑空誣陷羌佛，根本拿不出這份合同，公安只有誣蔑羌佛的假的「刑事案件立案報告表」，否則，就請公安拿出這份合同在網上，讓大家看看事實吧！劉娟早在二○○三年時就在美國寫過一份《陳述》，通過公證後寄給深圳市中級人民法院，證明她當時是受刑訊逼供後，「公安要我怎樣說我就怎樣說，按公安的意圖」做的假供，第三世多杰羌佛根本就沒有詐騙過她。另一個「受害人」劉百行也在二○一四年十二月九日的香港記者招待會上公開說，第三世多杰羌佛沒有騙錢，是黃曉穗欺詐他的財產，二○一五年四月二十三日，劉百行又再次寫證明說：「我的師父第三世多杰羌佛從來沒有騙過我！騙了我六千多萬港幣的是不肖師姐黃曉穗，香港法院已經判了她九年徒刑，收到了應有的法律制裁。我一直認為我的師父第三世多杰羌佛是最偉大無私的。」

令人不解的是，既然案件「受害人」和國際刑警組織都先後公開證明這是陷害第三世多杰羌佛的假案，中國又曾請求國際刑警撤銷了紅色通緝，為什麼廣東公安的《通緝令》還掛在網上，而不做了結，還人清白呢？這就是整個事件的核心所在了！

據透露，當年以陳紹基為首的廣東和深圳不法公安人員借辦案之機私吞了許多財物。他們不僅掠奪了第三世多杰羌佛幾十年心血創作的七百多幅書畫，吳文投購買收藏的七十多幅古代名畫（若按現今羌佛的書畫拍賣價格，被私吞的書畫價值至少四百多億人民幣），還掠奪了劉娟和吳文投合開的珠寶公司中的幾十斤黃金和珠寶、名錶等財物，這樣的大老虎不吃人才怪呢！

雖然以周永康、陳紹基為首陷害第三世多杰羌佛的貪官們，後來因自己在另外案子上的腐敗墮落相繼被查到判了刑，但當年貪腐的辦案員警依然混跡在廣東公安隊伍裡，他們為掩蓋自己的貪污罪行，極力阻止撤銷《通緝令》，原因是擔心自己的貪行暴露，便四處散佈謠言，故意把第三世多杰羌佛說成是壞人，以此來迷惑大眾，掩蓋自己的貪腐。更為關鍵的是，大慈大悲的第三世多杰羌佛對於任何陷害，誹謗，從不計較，也從不申訴，乃至「世界和平獎評審委員會」人員瞭解到真相後問祂，為何不把國際刑警的調查結論拿出來駁斥謠言時，H.H.第三世多杰羌佛說「我要做的事是：眾生的一切造業罪過由我承擔，我種的一切善業功德全給你們。拿出來清白了我，誹謗我的人就不清白了，他們的罪業誰承擔？」

而據媒體報道， H.H.第三世多杰羌佛早年時就已向全世界宣佈「終生不收任何人供養」，幾十年來，祂拒收別人供養千萬、上億資產的實例數不勝數，而且，在二○一五年三月「紐約春季拍賣會」上，第三世多杰羌佛以不到兩個小時創作的《墨荷》，只一張畫就以一六五○萬美金拍賣價奪冠，遠遠超越了此次春拍會中國古今大家的畫價，這樣一個有著巨大財富成就的偉人會去詐人錢財嗎？值得深思，更值得中國相關部門介入調查，四百多億的財產、幾十斤的黃金珠寶到底被誰貪腐了？ （文 / 鶴樓）

附件一：台灣時報新聞截圖

頂聖如來的聖量-- 佛降甘露是這樣得來的

面對無常輪迴及生老病死、三惡道的痛苦，我們是必須要依靠修行才能了脫的，為了解脫這一切痛苦，我看穿，也看破這紅塵世界的四大空相，我出家了。出家的目的就是依照佛陀的教誡，嚴持戒律，修行學佛，一點也不敢懈怠，也不敢違犯，因為我深深知道違犯就等於白出家了!更是浪費光陰!體悟到無常的迅速，我堅定的出離心徹底建立了， 在寺廟裡，三時之中如法修行，結果受用卻非常少，後來在多生累劫的福報殊勝因緣成熟了，到了中國拜多杰羌佛第三世雲高益西諾布頂聖如來為師，依止學密乘，沒有想到佛陀恩師規定的行持是首先必須把顯教學通，而且要經過顯教的考核，才會傳我密乘的加行、正行、結行。我以最虔誠的、敬謹之心依止在三世多杰羌佛那兒修學，終年住在比丘尼僧團，精進用功修持。 五年過去了，對明心見性已有體悟，見地上有了顯著受用，惟有在實際妙有的功夫上卻少有顯現。當我看到身邊的高僧大德師兄們，基本上很多證量都拿得出來，當時我又難過又緊張，感受到很大的壓力，我 自問:難道我以空洞理論就能了生脫死嗎?為什麼師兄們能展現佛法， 我不能呢?我曾多次向多杰羌佛第三世雲高益西諾布恩師請修甘露，佛 陀恩師每次都很慈悲地對我開示說:『修甘露的法我學了的，但是確實沒有把握把甘露降下來，我曾經修過幾次都沒有成，這絕不是決定能成功的法，因為凡要求佛降甘露，首先必須要求到甘露功德的法章，這法章是西藏的大活佛集體上萬人修火供所轉的功德，聚在一張有種子字的紙上，最重要的是雖然有上萬活佛、喇嘛修法火供，但是裡面沒有真正的大菩薩，代表布施的一位，代表智慧的一位，代表大悲的一位，代表忍辱的一位，代表神通的一位，如五聖諦，缺一諦這個甘露法章也是無效的，我是無法修請甘露的。』有一次一位西藏法王來了，帶了甘露令章來，我借機當下向佛陀恩師求修甘露，佛陀恩師照常說:『只能試試 看，如果不成功，不要失望，因為我確實沒有把握，你去修一下，成就成了，不成也就不成了。』起法儀軌我已經很熟悉了，我依法而行，祈求佛陀降甘露，法會結束後，修得只有一個空缽，佛陀沒有為我的祈求 降下甘露，這次我真的沒有難過，因為我知道這個法太大了，我佛陀恩 師也真誠地說明了他都沒有絕對的把握，我修不了是正常的，佛陀恩師特別給我作了開示。又過了一年，我又修了一次，還是一無所獲，這一 次我心裡非常慚愧和難過，世界佛教僧伽會主席悟明長老曾在佛陀恩師座下洗法缽，佛陀恩師為他們一批高僧求來甘露，為什麼我就不行?懇求佛陀恩師開示，為什麼我無法為眾生帶來實質利益?佛陀恩師慈悲作了開示:『修佛降甘露是要若干因緣聚合，只要一個條件不具備，就是法緣不具，這次修來了，這是不幸中的偶然的幸事，而且在條件中，悟明、意昭老和尚功德大、道量高，他們有緣享受到了真正的五聖諦法章。』佛陀恩師還說:『修甘露至少要有真的五聖諦法章，具備了這一 張法緣的外緣作為基礎，還得要行持如法。』我稟告佛陀恩師，一切儀軌都沒有錯，佛陀恩師說:『你沒有理解到我講的行持如法，不是指求甘露的儀軌，而是「什麼叫修行」，你要深入我教你們的修行，自己的行持一定要如佛如菩薩。』當下我無地自容，並發大懺悔(佛陀恩師傳 的修行法這一法寶現已收錄在《正法寶典》中)，從那時起，每時每刻反覆憶持，堅持落實我的三業，深深體會到修行真不簡單，微妙極了! 其中如果夾雜了無明的暗砂，修得不徹底，或菩提心發不到位，就不叫真修行。就這樣如實行持，一天猛然覺醒，我來一個『我』字徹底放下，就地修正。 又修了三個月，正逢因緣和合，請到了萬人高僧法王仁波且們的火供法章，為選擇洗甘露法缽的人，佛陀恩師開始選擇人選，當時從台灣 和美國二十多位老修行中選拔，其中有仁波且、大法師，美國有我和邢格西，及西瑪仁波且三位列席，最後，萬萬沒想到，我這位慚愧比丘尼被選上執持修法。壇城沐浴開光後，我們首先恭迎佛陀恩師陞座，當時我身心斗變，加持力甚大，我知道，佛陀恩師今天一定會請來佛陀降甘露，但也有些擔心，因為佛陀恩師在修法前對我說，這求佛降甘露，他確實沒有把握，如果沒有求到，這是因緣不夠，希望我理解，但是不管怎樣也要好好學佛，利益眾生。我聽了佛陀恩師的一席話，感到非常慚愧，在法會中我如法依儀軌洗缽，所有人員的誦咒把整個壇場宣成一片梵音，吉祥無比，燃燒萬眾僧火供功德法章以後，天空和壇場殊勝無比，法師們見到天空出現了動態的佛陀和觀音菩薩，這一次佛陀降下甘露了，在紫金銅法缽中跳動，眾僧和居士們在現場見到，個個激動，發心要好好修行，利益大眾。這一偉大的佛法聖蹟，新聞記者在中英文媒 體報導了現場實況。今天回想起來，這些在場的人他們發心感人，但他們真正悟了什麼叫修行嗎?其實很多人都沒有悟到，沒有!跟我當初一 樣，雖然作了住持，但修行有缺，也未能做到。我們都應該把佛陀恩師的《正法寶典》認認真真看，真正以三業相應去修持，如實落實佛陀恩 師為我們傳的修行法，才會得到成就! 關於佛降甘露，我要在這發誓，當時我當著僧眾及居士們的面前， 洗淨了朱紅色紫金銅法缽，我沒有做過任何手腳，沒有放過任何東西在法缽裡，大家看見甘露降下，還因各人因緣不同，看到金光、紅光，佛 陀降甘露一絲一絲穿入缽蓋到法缽中。我如果說了假話或做了手腳，放 東西在裡面欺騙眾生，我將遭惡報，墮入三惡道中，無止盡受一切罪報痛苦。出家人賭咒發誓，世人看來很俗氣，但這一俗氣將化作我真實不虛出家人純正的心。佛降甘露的成功，讓我徹底深思悟到修行的重要! 不然洗缽都會把黑業污染法缽，因緣不上妙殊勝，又怎麼有甘露加持降臨呢?尤其我佛陀恩師在《正法寶典》中所傳『什麼叫修行』這一大法，是真正的無價珍寶啊!是百千萬劫眾生的福音!

慚愧比丘尼 釋隆慧

佛降甘露:

新聞報導:

美參議院決議表彰世界和平奬得主 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛

華府訊

美國國會參議院於2012年12月12日通過614號提案決議，該提案是經無記名投票全數一致無異議通過的決議，對世界和平奬頒獎委員會頒發世界和平奬最高榮譽獎給美國總統雷根、Ｈ.H.第三世多杰羌佛、美國外交委員會前主席班哲明吉爾曼等予以表彰。同時祝賀表揚獲頒世界和平奬最高榮譽奬的獲奬人H.H.第三世多杰羌佛與美國外交委員會前主席班哲明吉爾曼為人類所做的貢獻。

美國國會紀錄參議院614號決議，決議認定世界和平獎頒獎委員會是一個以促進和平、正義、宗教間合作為核心精神的國際組織並祝賀所有世界和平奬的得獎人。決議文件指明世界和平奬頒獎委員會頒發的世界和平奬是舉世聞名的正確的，用以表彰對世界和平與人類啓蒙有巨大貢獻的個人。決議針對過去得獎人，提名指出美國總統雷根、印尼前總統瓦希德、帕勞前總統中村國雄、Ｈ.Ｈ.第三世多杰羌佛、班哲明吉爾曼主席。文件中用了兩段文字來特別介紹Ｈ.H.第三世多杰羌佛對人類所做的貢獻，同時也用一段文字介紹了前外交委員會主席所作出的貢獻。

國會將參議院第614號提案決議，上在國會紀錄文中，記錄文中說，世界和平獎頒獎委員會表彰H.H.第三世多杰羌佛致力於對世界各地不同社群的個人所做的廣泛的人道主義活動。而且H.H.第三世多杰羌佛獲得的獎章無數，鑑於祂在藝術、醫藥、倫理、佛教、精神領導與對美國社會的傑出貢獻，美國總統亞太裔顧問委員會代表布希總統頒發總統金質獎章給第H.H.第三世多杰羌佛。而且提案決議中正式用His Holiness ( 取這兩個字的字首簡寫為H.H.) 頭銜來冠名稱呼第三世多杰羌佛，這在整個世界上只有天主教的教皇，才被認可享受將Ｈ.Ｈ. 這樣的頭銜冠在名字前面的，因此614號提案決議上用H.H.第三世多杰羌佛，也充分說明國會對Ｈ.Ｈ.第三世多杰羌佛的定性。

至於班哲明吉爾曼則以終身人權冠軍，為反世界飢餓、反麻醉品濫用、反麻醉品運送而奮戰方面作出貢獻。

Youtube頻道:

 

附錄一：新聞截圖

http://www.ettoday.net/news/20130111/151787.htm

附錄二：第 614 號決議全文

https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-resolution/614/text

112th CONGRESS2d Session

S. RES. 614

Celebrating the World Peace Corps Mission and the World Peace Prize.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

December 12, 2012

Mr. Menendez (for himself and Ms. Snowe) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Celebrating the World Peace Corps Mission and the World Peace Prize.

Whereas the World Peace Corps Mission is an international organization that operates according to the core spirit of advancing peace, justice, and inter-religious collaborations;

Whereas the World Peace Prize is a prestigious award presented by the World Peace Corps Mission that celebrates individuals who have contributed tremendously to peace and enlightenment for humanity;

Whereas past recipients of the World Peace Prize include President Ronald Reagan of the United States, President Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia, and President Nakamura of Palau;

Whereas in 2010, the World Peace Prize Awarding Council recognized His Holiness Dorje Chang Buddha III (referred to in this preamble as “H.H. Dorje Chang Buddha III”) for his devotion to an immensely wide scope of humanitarian activities directed at individuals from different communities throughout the world;

Whereas H.H. Dorje Chang Buddha III has received numerous awards, including the United States Presidential Gold Award, which the Chairman of the President’s Advisory Commission on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders presented on behalf of President George W. Bush to H.H. Dorje Chang Buddha III for the outstanding contributions of H.H. Dorje Chang Buddha III to the arts, medicine, ethics, Buddhism, spiritual leadership, and United States society; and

Whereas in 2010, the World Peace Prize Awarding Council also recognized the Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman for being a life-long champion of human rights who has fought world hunger, narcotics abuse, and narcotics trafficking: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) commends the World Peace Corps Mission for advancing peace, justice, and inter-religious collaborations; and

(2) celebrates the World Peace Award and the recipients of the World Peace Award.

附錄三：第 614 號決議全文截圖

2017/01/04 高智球活動@安東國小

2017/01/04 高智球活動@安東國小

2017財神會館講座

美洲國家組織舉辦義雲高大師韻雕作品展

前言:

  二零零八年四月三日，由全球佛教出版社和世界法音出版社出版的《多杰羌佛第三世》寶書在美國國會圖書館舉行了莊嚴隆重的首發儀式，美國國會圖書館並正式收藏此書，自此人們才知道原來一直廣受大家尊敬的義雲高大師就是宇宙始祖報身佛多杰羌佛的第三世降世，佛號為第三世多杰羌佛，從此，人們就以“南無第三世多杰羌佛”來稱呼了。這就猶如釋迦牟尼佛未成佛前，其名號為悉達多太子，但自釋迦牟尼佛成佛以後，就改稱“南無釋迦牟尼佛”了，所以，我們現在稱“南無第三世多杰羌佛”。尤其是，二零一二年十二月十二日，美國國會參議院第614號決議正式以His Holiness來冠名第三世多杰羌佛（即H.H.第三世多杰羌佛），這說明了美國國會對南無第三世多杰羌佛的尊敬。而且，第三世多杰羌佛也是政府法定的名字，以前的“義雲高”和大師的尊稱已經不存在了。但是，這個新聞是在南無第三世多杰羌佛佛號未公布之前刊登的，那時人們還不了解佛陀的真正身份，所以，為了尊重歷史的真實，我們在新聞中仍然保留未法定第三世多杰羌佛稱號前所用的名字。

美洲國家組織官方網站公告

OAS SECRETARY GENERAL OPENS EXHIBITION OF SCULPTURES 

 July 29, 2003

Noting that promoting cultural values is a priority of the inter-American system, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), César Gaviria, opened an exhibition of carved stone sculptures by master artist Wan Ko Yee.

“During the last fifty years, the OAS has recognized the need to associate culture with development and the well-being of our peoples, and also the importance of demonstrating how powerful symbols of identities and beliefs can become a unifying factor for national and universal reconciliation,” Gaviria said. Diplomats from OAS member states and other dignitaries were among those who attended the opening reception, held the evening of July 28 at the Washington Marriott.

In his remarks, Gaviria praised the “pioneering” artistic work of the Buddhist artist and recognized him for championing charitable causes and humanitarian assistance programs in several Caribbean nations.

Grenada’s Ambassador to the OAS, Denis Antoine, said the artist had donated computers to needy schoolchildren in his country and supported other worthy projects. He said the Organization’s participation in the event underscored the importance of “cultural balance and tolerance for diversity in a global environment.” 

Master Wan Ko Yee was born in China and now lives in the United States. His Yun sculptures are made of enormous boulders, hollowed out and carved to create a landscape shrouded in mist.

剪報附錄:

聯合國際世界佛教總部公告 （公告字第20170101號）

聖考結果公佈

為了幫助佛教修行人士選擇具備有德、有修行、有道、有佛法的善知識，聯合國際世界佛教總部用了兩年的時間公開對上師級的人實行了考試，從世界各地來參加報名入考的有聞法上師，有傳法上師，其中有尊者、法王、活佛、法師、居士等身份的修行人共一萬一千六百五十七人，正式入考經律論百題書面答卷的有三千二百七十三人，而最 終具資格聖考的人只有一千零八十五人。

本總部實行的聖考是建立在經律論百題考試的基礎上進行的，這些題 出於經律論的正知正教，現舉數例如下：1.佛教的觀點與其它宗教 的觀點相同嗎？是神仰論？還是非神仰論？2.般若的力量與真言是 什麼關係？3.說出定慧的來源與作用。4.簡述般若、中觀、 俱舍的理念、一體性和矛盾。5.斷見與常見的利與弊，怎樣才正確 ？6.密宗異別顯宗的差別？7.簡單解釋信愿行、戒定慧。8.參 禪的目的要參出個什麼？9.三界包括哪些組成的？什麼是法界？1 0.果中之因是怎麼回事？11.什麼叫妄念心？什麼叫智慧境？1 2.解釋《解脫大手印》為什麼超越了禪凈密的快捷成就？13.講 出中有教授的中陰成佛到底如何？14.什麼叫無為法？ 什麼叫有為法？15.講出放焰口、伏魔火供、水陸法會、施身法、 金剛法曼，各法的作用？16.唯實法相的解脫觀是什麼？華嚴宗、 律宗、阿含宗互相之間有什麼不同？17.何為頑空、小空、大空、 空空、寂滅空、真空或十八空？18.何為因明現量、比量、 已知境智、未知境智？何為無二智？19.列出密宗常見的五部灌頂 是誰執灌？屬於內密還是外密或勝義密？20.概說什麼是禪、 什麼是定、什麼是止、什麼是觀？四禪八定、三身四智的作用是什麼 ？21.闡述自然智見與他空見，我空、法空與人空、 法空是怎麼回事？差別在哪裡？出於何宗何派？22.龍樹、提婆、 陳那、月稱、世親、無著、商羯羅、佛護他們各自主要作了些什麼論 著？各個論著的觀點重點是什麼？

一百道題考了以後進入聖考，聖考則以法門宮羽為入圍擇決，主考是 用輪迴八風陣和金剛陣入考，而兩種陣法中又分大陣和小陣進行了入考，八風陣和金剛陣的聖考都是有七聖十證， 加上很多考生在一起共同、公開、平等， 在大家同等的條件下進行的。這就猶如一個石頭放在地上， 大家平等去拿，有的人一次能拿得起，到三次就拿不起了， 有的人第一次拿起來，第二次拿不起了，有的人一次也拿不起。比如 用一根繩子圈上約兩萬平方英呎的地，雖然只隔一條繩子，大家都能 看得很清楚，可是有的考生，段位夠的時候，能走得進去，段位不夠 時，就走不過這一條繩了，甚至當下昏倒在繩子的界外，而且參加考 試的考生都在互相觀看監督。從陣中考出的不同級別的德人師資， 有三段金釦大聖德，如旺扎上尊，整個考試皆由旺扎上尊坐陣主考。 三段金釦位稱上尊，屬於大聖德等級，已是不退地菩薩， 本不需要參加考試，但是旺扎上尊作為坐陣主考，祂為了以身作則， 主動要求考試。二段金釦位稱教尊，屬於聖德等級； 一段金釦位稱孺尊，屬於聖德等級。再以下即是藍釦， 藍釦的最高一級是藍三黑二段，位稱大德，再下是藍三黑一段， 位稱宣德，再下是藍釦三段，位稱潤德，再下是藍釦二段， 位稱增德，再下是藍釦一段，位稱行德。能掛上一個德字， 已經很不簡單，行德之下就是沒有段位了，不屬於師資範疇。就是只 考上藍釦一段的行德，都必須要在學佛修行上有明顯的進益，或有聞 法點利益大家，具行與德，因此，儘管只是藍釦一段，此人在某些方面也有值得大家學習的道德。

在2016年12月31日，聯合國際世界佛教總部實行的兩年公開 的考試已經正式結束了，現在不再接受考生報名考試， 在這裡要特別告訴大家的是，除了金釦三段的上尊大菩薩級和以上的 道行是不退地之外，餘者都有可能在修行學佛中落入128條知見而 退道，所以本總部將會對德人們進行抽查年審，目的在於保障學佛修 行人的安全，以防被退道之師誤導。

目前，上尊級的大聖德在全世界只有一位在弘法，祂就是大聖德旺扎 上尊，另外的均未公開弘法；而教尊級的聖德只考上了兩位， 他們都在弘法，但沒有收徒；孺尊級的聖德只考上了四位， 只有一位在公開收徒弘法，餘者三位都沒有收徒； 藍三黑二段的大德只考上了兩位，都在行持佛事，但沒有收徒； 藍三黑一段考上了七位，除了兩位在行持佛事但沒有收徒外， 其他五位都在收徒、設聞法點等；藍釦三段考上了十三位， 都在設聞法點，也在收徒；藍釦二段考上了五十八位， 都在設聞法點，基本上都在收徒；藍釦一段考上的非常多， 有的在收徒，有的只辦聞法點。旺扎上尊特別告誡考上段位的為師者 們說：“首先恭賀你們獲得不同等級的考績段位， 但我必須清楚地告誡你們：南無第三世多杰羌佛為什麼反對用聖考來 最終定段位？現在我才悟到，聖考雖然能擇決出最正確的師資級別， 為行人們防止邪師騙子作出了成績，但為師之人要依靠聖考來成就是 不可能的。要解脫成就，還必須得聞聽南無第三世多杰羌佛的說法法 音，看懂羌佛的佛書，依教修行學法，方可成就。記住， 你們是佛教徒，也就是釋迦牟尼佛和十方諸佛的弟子， 我不是你們的段位師，我也是學羌佛恩師和釋迦佛陀的教授在修行， 所以，希望大家要諸惡莫作，眾善奉行，如實依佛陀教授， 修行利生，才能最終成就解脫，這才是目的。”

大家注意，如果發現已經考了試的上師沒有穿著段位釦裝，則說明此 上師已經退道，不是真正學佛修行人，而是借用佛教來行詐騙的騙子 ！！！其原因是此上師擔心弟子們看到他自己的段位不高，與之前自 己的誇大宣傳不符，而發現自己已經是退道的騙子本質，故索性來一 個不穿段位釦裝，蒙混一時算一時，多騙一人是一人。另外， 也有一種情況就是，有的人報了名，不敢來考試，有的人考了筆試， 但成績太差，沒有入圍，因此沒有段位釦裝可穿，這些人自然也不屬 於師資範疇，希望他們能繼續努力，早日成為德人。

為了防止有些上師的邪惡行為，故意不穿段位釦裝來蒙混佛弟子們， 以便以假冒真、以低充高，詐騙大家，本總部現特別將聖考結果公告 大眾，大家可以從2017年1月15日起向聯合國際世界佛教總部 咨詢印證德人們的具體考績，咨詢電話是+1-626-789- 1001，咨詢email是uiwbahinquiry@ gmail.com。

聯合國際世界佛教總部

2017年1月1日

連結:聯合國際世界佛教總部公告字第20170101號聖考結果公佈

黄晓穗被香港法院判決入狱11年(含判決書)

人民网香港11月21日电       香港明星佛堂“云慈慧海”诈骗案昨天宣判。云慈慧海功德会前主席黄晓穗及其弟黄辉栋，分别被重判入狱11年及7年半，另被剥夺担任公司董事权利15年。2人的律师均认为刑罚极重。     法官指出，两被告犯案，令新华银行向次被告两间公司借出的9300万元贷款变成坏帐。     黄晓穗(44岁)及其弟黄辉栋(34岁，金科数码国际控股前董事总经理)，于1999年初伪造佛堂董事的会议议案，将“云慈慧海”位于九龙塘根德道22号价值5600万元的“大师馆”抵押给新华银行，藉此替黄辉栋的两间公司取得信贷服务。     法官指出，被告姐弟早就觊觎佛堂物业，根德道的物业1995年由佛堂“富豪信徒”刘百行购入后不足两年，被告即将物业交予银行估价，并且打算申请按揭，虽然后来放弃计划，但是1999年再将物业抵押，为黄辉栋名下的东荣有限公司以及嘉陵汽车(中国)有限公司取得4000万元信贷服务。按揭后不久，信贷户口即先后被提取2000万元。而直至现在，两间公司还分别欠新华银行3500万、5800万元。（吴酩）

消息来源：人民网 2002年11月21日 判決書連結: 香港法院判處黃曉穗等的最終判決書 CACC 589/2002 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 589 OF 2002 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC355 OF 2001) ____________________ BETWEEN 　 HKSAR Respondent 　 and 　 　 WONG HIU SHUI, TERESA LINERA (黃曉穗)  (D1) Applicants   WONG FAI TUNG (黃輝棟)  (D2)   ____________________ Before:   Hon Stuart-Moore VP, Stock JA and Lunn J Date of Hearing: 26 October 2004 Date of Handing Down Judgment: 3 December 2004      _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ Stuart-Moore, VP (giving the judgment of the Court): Introduction 1.  On 6 November 2002, the applicants (D1 and D2 respectively) were convicted by a jury on the four counts jointly alleged against them, following a trial in the Court of First Instance before Deputy Judge To.  On 20 November 2002, D1 was sentenced to a total of 11 years’ imprisonment and D2 received an overall sentence of seven and a half years.  They were each, in addition, disqualified to act as a director of a company for 15 years under section 168E of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32. 2.  D1 and D2 both sought leave to appeal against conviction.  D1, additionally, sought leave to appeal against her sentence of imprisonment. 3.  We can say at the outset that although this application was concerned with five grounds of appeal with which counsel had, in advance, very sensibly worked out a division of labour so that the same arguments were not repeated, there is, we consider, only one ground of any real substance.  This related to the directions given by the judge on the standard of proof.  Nonetheless, one of the other grounds requires an insight into the background of the case and it is necessary, therefore, to deal with this aspect before turning to the main ground of appeal. The indictment 4.  The first count on the indictment alleged forgery, contrary to section 71 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200.  The particulars were that D1 and D2, between 1 February 1999 and 20 February 1999: “…. made false instruments, namely documents of International Wisdom & Mercy VDA S.A. consisting of four minutes of meetings of the board of directors, two written resolutions of the shareholders and two declarations of the directors and shareholders, all dated the 9th day of February 1999 in relation to a first and second mortgage on the property known as 22 Kent Road, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, with the intention that they should use them to induce somebody to accept them as genuine, and by reason of so accepting them, to do some act, or not to do some act, to his or her own or another person’s prejudice.”  (Appeal bundle pp. 1-2) 5.  In the second count, contrary to section 73 of the same ordinance, charging D1 and D2 with using the false instruments set out in count 1, it was alleged that on or about 20 February 1999 they did so knowing or believing them to be false and with the same dual intention as expressed in the first count. 6.  Counts 3 and 4 both alleged that D1 and D2 had procured the execution of a valuable security, contrary to section 22(2) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap. 210.  Count 3’s particulars were that between 1 February 1999 and 31 March 1999, they dishonestly and with a view to gain for themselves or another or with intent to cause loss to another: “…. procured from the Sin Hua Bank Limited (the Bank) the execution of a valuable security, namely a mortgage dated the 1st day of March 1999 between the Bank as mortgagee and International Wisdom & Mercy VDA S.A. (the company) as mortgagor with Tacglory Limited as borrower by deception, namely by falsely representing that the company and its directors and shareholders had approved the use of the property known as 22 Kent Road, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, as security to the Bank for credit facilities granted or to be granted to Tacglory Limited.”  (Appeal bundle p. 3) 7.  The particulars of count 4 were the same as set out in count 3 except that the borrower was described as P&T Motors (China) Limited (“PTM”). Prosecution’s case 8.  Adopting in large measure the helpful summary of the case for the prosecution which has been prepared on behalf of the respondent by Mr Simon Tam, the events which formed the background to this case began in October 1995.  At that time, Mr Lau Pak-hun made $62.8 million available to a religious organisation known as International Wisdom Mercy VDA S.A. (“IWM”).  Its purpose was for the purchase of a property at 22 Kent Road, Kowloon Tong (“the Property”), in order that it could be used as a museum to promote the teaching of his Mizong master, Yi Yunggao (“Master Yi”), and as a meeting place for Master Yi’s disciples in Hong Kong.  IWM had three shareholders, namely, Mr Lau, Tse Kit-ha (PW2) and D1, and the Property was held in trust for Mr Lau.  There were ten directors who included the three shareholders. 9.  D1 became a highly trusted disciple of Master Yi and acted as his representative in Hong Kong.  However, in April 1997, about 18 months after the acquisition of the Property, D1’s younger brother, D2, who was neither a follower of Master Yi nor affiliated with IWM, attempted to offer the Property to the Sin Hua Bank (“the Bank”) as a security for obtaining banking facilities for his companies, Tacglory Limited (“Tacglory”) and PTM.  In the event, this came to nothing. 10.  Neither Tacglory nor PTM had any connection with the religious organisation to which D1 belonged.  D1 and D2 were directors and shareholders of Tacglory.  D2 and Tacglory were also directors and shareholders of PTM, and hence D1, through her interest in Tacglory, also had an interest in PTM.  11.  Towards the end of 1998, the Bank reviewed the banking facilities to these companies and demanded additional security.  Again this came to nothing, but, in early 1999, D2 again offered the Property as security to the Bank to obtain a credit facility for Tacglory.  In short, this was achieved by using the eight documents purportedly signed by Mr Lau, PW2, D1 and some of the other directors.  The documents formed the subject matter of the 1st and 2nd counts.  The Bank then executed the two mortgages, the subject of the 3rd and 4th counts. 12.  In July 1999, relations between Master Yi and his Hong Kong disciples turned sour.  In essence, it was believed that he had acted fraudulently and also inappropriately in a number of other ways.  Accordingly, it was resolved that the museum would be closed and that IWM would be disbanded. 13.  On 18 September 1999, IWM passed a resolution to transfer the Property to Mr Lau.  The meeting also authorised D1 to effect the transfer.  It was after D1 had failed to carry out this task that the other directors and shareholders discovered for the first time that the Property had been mortgaged to the Bank as security for the banking facilities given to Tacglory and PTM.  For his part, Mr Lau, who had been led by D1 to believe that D2 had a listed company and was a person of means, told D2 that he had never consented to the mortgage of the Property.  In response, D2 remained motionless.  Mr Lau suggested a solution to the problem by offering to pay $20 million leaving D2 to pay the balance of the sum to redeem the Property.  The amount Mr Lau had offered to pay was fixed on the basis that the Property had been mortgaged for a total of $40 million and this went halfway.  His concern was the damage that might otherwise be done to the religious organisation by the disgrace this incident could bring to its name.  D2 replied that that could not be done as there were binding contracts between IWM and the two companies, Tacglory and PTM. 14.  The matter was eventually reported to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (“ICAC”) after civil proceedings had been commenced. 15.  Amongst the documents seized by ICAC from the Bank were the minutes of what purported to be meetings of IWM’s directors recording the resolutions of the shareholders and the declarations of the directors and shareholders of IWM approving the mortgage of the Property.  These were all dated 9 February 1999.  The prosecution’s case was that these documents (Exhibits P4 and P5) were either signed by the relevant directors and shareholders in blank form or were signed with no more than the standard preamble used for recording the minutes of meetings thereon and that, thereafter, resolutions had been added purporting to execute Deeds of Mortgage.  It was alleged that D1 and D2 caused Exhibits P4 and P5 to be created so that these resolutions and other details could later be added to them.  Needless to say, when the documents were signed in more or less blank form, they were intended by all the signatories except D1, IWM’s chairman, to be used for the legitimate affairs of IWM.  The evidence clearly established that whatever else the documents might have been used for, they were not intended for the purpose of mortgaging the company’s property and that the relevant directors and shareholders, apart from D1, would not have signed the documents if they had known they were going to be used in this way. Defence case 16.  Neither of the applicants gave evidence.  However, both of them replied to questions they were asked in interview by ICAC officers. 17.  D1’s defence at trial was presented on the basis of the answers she had provided in interview.  D1 claimed that prior to July 1999, Mr Lau, PW2 and the other directors who signed the documents were devoted disciples of Master Yi and that they would have done anything for him.  More specifically, they would sign any document Master Yi told them to.  Accordingly, they signed the documents on the instructions of Master Yi, which D1 had transmitted to them, knowing that the documents were mortgage documents and in the full knowledge of what it was that they were being asked to sign.  In relation to the 1stand 2nd counts, it was said that the documents were not forgeries and, in regard to counts 3 and 4, D1 asserted that there had been no deception. 18.  D2’s case was also presented on the answers he gave at his interview.  He said that he had acted at the request of his sister (D1), to raise $5 million for IWM at the bidding of Master Yi.  He relied on what he was told by D1 as well as on the documents she supplied to him.  D2 claimed to have had no knowledge of any forgery or deception, saying that if the documents were forgeries, he had not acted dishonestly. 19.  The defence did not dispute that the applicants had jointly procured the Bank’s execution of the mortgage deeds by the use of Exhibits P4 and P5.  It was claimed that after the Hong Kong disciples discovered that Master Yi was effectively a fraud, they levelled the blame at D1 because she had been closest to him and had acted as his Hong Kong representative.  The disciples felt cheated out of large sums of money by Master Yi which they could not recover but, as the Property had been purchased with Mr Lau’s donation, this at least was still available.  Mr Lau, it was alleged, had insisted that the Property should be returned to him and he had agreed to sell the Property so that the losses suffered by the Hong Kong disciples could be partly restored to them.  For this reason, it was suggested, the Hong Kong disciples turned against D1 because of the benefit they hoped to gain from the sale of the Property.  When D1 was unable to transfer the Property to Mr Lau, it was alleged that Mr Lau reported the matter to the ICAC in order to pressurise D1 into satisfying the civil claim against her. The evidence 20.  The first main category of evidence at trial came from the two shareholders apart from D1 and five other directors of IWM, all of whom testified that they had not signed the minutes of meetings of directors containing the resolutions of shareholders and the declarations of shareholders and directors, in the form which appears in Exhibits P4 and P5.  Although it was accepted that their signatures appeared on those documents, they said that they had known nothing about the contents and had not given their consent for the Property to be used for the benefit of Tacglory and PTM.  Evidence was also given by Sek Wai-tong (PW10), the accountant used by IWM, who said that he had not prepared the minutes resolving to mortgage the Property. 21.  The second main category of evidence came from bankers and lawyers who handled the mortgage of the Property.  The lawyers acting on behalf of the Bank made it a condition of the mortgage that at least four directors should sign the minutes and that all three shareholders should sign the resolutions approving the use of the company’s property as security for the credit facilities of Tacglory and PTM. 22.  Other evidence of considerable importance at trial came from an expert document examiner whose evidence was not seriously challenged.  His findings went to prove that the documents (Exhibits P4 and P5) were false in the sense that later additions had been made to them. 23.  As we have said already, there was a further category of evidence which related to the interviews of the applicants which provided the basis on which their cases were presented. Grounds of appeal (conviction) (1)    Standard of Proof 24.  In what we consider to have been the principal ground of appeal, it was submitted that the judge’s directions on the standard of proof were materially erroneous in that they: (i)    incorporated an attempt to define a ‘reasonable doubt’; and (ii)    may have left the jury with the impression that a doubt about the guilt of a defendant was to be disregarded if it was “fanciful, stupid or ridiculous” and that guilt did not need to be proved to a “mathematical certainty”. 25.  In the early part of the summing up, the judge gave the following directions which contain the passages about which the complaint in this ground of appeal is directed.  He said: “Secondly, the standard of proof.  The prosecution must prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused person is guilty of the offence with which they are charged, before you can convict them.  A reasonable doubt is precisely what it says, a reasonable doubt as opposed to a fanciful, stupid or ridiculous doubt.  Prosecution does not have to prove the guilt of an accused to a mathematical certainty.  Human affairs do not lend themselves to that degree of certainty, but the prosecution has to prove to your satisfaction, so that you feel sure that the accused is guilty…..”  (Appeal bundle p. 19) Immediately following this, the judge went on to say: “It is only then, would it be your duty to convict.  This is a very high standard; unless you are sure of his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to acquit.  It is not enough for the prosecution to establish that there are very strong suspicious circumstances involving the accused person, or that he or she is probably guilty.  If, having considered all the evidence, you are left in a reasonable doubt, then you must acquit the accused, because prosecution has failed to discharge its burden. In the course of my summing-up, you may hear me saying ‘proved’, ‘conclude’, ‘find’, ‘believe’ or ‘satisfy’ etc.  These words are all to be read as if they are followed by the words ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’.  I may sometimes leave them out because it is too repetitive or sometimes by a slip of the tongue, but remember the concept beyond all reasonable doubt is there and always there when I use those words.”  (Appeal bundle p. 19) 26.  It was contended that although this later direction and others in similar terms, to which we shall turn in due course, were unobjectionable in themselves, they were qualified by what had been said in the passages which are criticised.  In particular, it was submitted that the judge had directed the jury in a way which, in the courts of Australia, has been found not merely to be undesirable but to have amounted to a fatal misdirection.  Applying this jurisprudence to the present case, it was argued that these convictions must be quashed. 27.  In Green v R [1971] 126 CLR 28, which Mr Grounds described as the seminal Australian case dealing with the point at issue, the High Court held that it was a misdirection to state that a reasonable doubt is confined to a “rational doubt” or a “doubt founded upon reason”.  In that case, the trial judge had answered the rhetorical question he had posed, as to how the jury would know when they had reached the stage of being satisfied about something beyond a reasonable doubt, by directing them (in a passage which appears at pp. 30-31) that: “…. it is when you have reached the stage that you either have no doubt at all, because if you have got no doubt at all you must have got rid of all reasonable doubts; or if there is some thing nagging in the back of your mind which makes you hesitate as to whether you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, you have got to try and take it out and identify this thing which is causing the hesitation, causing the doubt if you like, and you have a look at it and you try to assess it and you say to yourself is this doubt that is bothering me, does it proceed from reason; is it a rational doubt; is it something which raises a really sensible doubt; or is it a fantastic sort of doubt; is it something which arises from some prejudice that I may have; some quite unreasonable fear that I might go wrong; some perhaps reluctance to make an unpleasant finding.  Well, if it is one of those doubts – merely one of those doubts, then of course it cannot be described as reasonable because it does not come from reason; it comes from something which is emotional or irrational or – at any rate it is not based upon reason, and if you have had a look at what is bothering you and you decide that it does proceed from something which is not reason but something fantastic or rising out of prejudice or one of these other things, then you should say to yourself, ‘The only doubt I’ve got is one which is not based on reason, I have therefore got rid of all doubts which are not based in reason, and the result of that is that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, because the only things that are worrying me are things which I now assess after looking at them as not based in reason.’” However, the directions did not end there and, when later the court (at p. 32) went on to say that it was “unable to feel any confidence as to what (the jury) would understand by the totality of what the judge told them”, it was the further direction which was described as being the “dominant impression” with which the jury would have been left.  This direction (at p. 31) was in these terms: “And of course it is a commonsense point of view before you find anybody guilty of a crime like this, you do need to feel comfortable about it; you do need to feel, ‘Very well, I’ve considered everything and I’m really satisfied.  I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt; I have given it the best consideration I can.’  There it is.  And then you go away from the court and you are comfortable, and that is the way you ought to be.  You might not enjoy it, but you will nevertheless be comfortable, and unless you can make a decision of guilt and feel comfortable that it is the right decision, well then you do not make it.” The court made the point that although later in the summing up the trial judge had made references to the need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, these were “controlled” by the way the judge had expressed the definition in the passages we have just cited.  The judgment also set out a number of earlier admonitions which had been issued to judges in other criminal trials “to adhere to and not to attempt needless explanations of the classical statement of the nature of the onus of proof resting on the Crown” and went on (at p. 32) to say that it was “remarkable that in this instance the learned judge, undeterred by the failures of illustrious predecessors, has made a new endeavour to explain that which requires no explanation and to improve upon the traditional formula”.  The court went on to say, when allowing the appeal, that “so far from succeeding where they did not, he has, in our opinion, not only confused the jury but misdirected them”.  The judgment (at pp. 32-34) continued as follows: “…. the direction was in our opinion fundamentally erroneous.  A reasonable doubt is a doubt which the particular jury entertain in the circumstances.  Jurymen themselves set the standard of what is reasonable in the circumstances.  It is that ability which is attributed to them which is one of the virtues of our mode of trial: to their task of deciding facts they bring to bear their experience and judgment.  They are both unaccustomed and not required to submit their processes of mind to objective analysis of the kind proposed in the language of the judge in this case.  ‘It is not their task to analyse their own mental processes’: Windeyer J., Thomas v. The Queen ([1960] 102 CLR, at p. 606).  A reasonable doubt which a jury may entertain is not to be confined to a ‘rational doubt’, or a ‘doubt founded on reason’ in the analytical sense or by such detailed processes as those proposed by the passage we have quoted from the summing up.  Yet that is what they were directed to do in this case. But the error, in our opinion, does not end there.  If the jury could get any clear picture from the trial judge’s directions, we think the predominant impression they would take to the jury room would be that a comfortable satisfaction of the accused’s guilt would be enough to warrant conviction.  It seems to us that the language used in this portion of the summing up equated satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt with that comfortable satisfaction felt by persons who have done their best and depart self-satisfied with their efforts.  Such a standard of conduct on the part of a jury in a criminal trial would in our opinion be a denial of that traditional solicitude for certainty expressed in the traditional formula as to the onus of proof. If during the course of a trial, particularly in his address to the jury, counsel for the accused has laboured the emphasis on the onus of proof to such a degree as to suggest to the minds of the jury that possibilities which are in truth fantastic or completely unreal ought by them to be regarded as affording a reason for doubt, it would be proper and indeed necessary for the presiding judge to restore, but to do no more than restore, the balance.  In such a case the judge can properly instruct the jury that fantastic and unreal possibilities ought not to be regarded by them as the source of reasonable doubt.  In the passage which we have quoted from the summing up in this case the trial judge did alert the jury to the impropriety of acting upon such possibilities.  We do not know whether counsel for the accused had actually sought to influence the jury in an inadmissible way calling for the judge’s intervention.  But in any case as we have indicated the judge did not confine his remarks to restoring a proper balance in the mind of the jury.  Cf. Thomas v. The Queen, per Windeyer J. ([1960] 102 CLR at p. 605). Lastly on this aspect of the summing up, the language of the trial judge was calculated to lessen the sense of responsibility of the jury in the sense in which that expression was used by Isaacs and Rich JJ. in Hicks v. The King([1920] 28 CLR 36 at p. 46).  It seems to us that its clear tendency apart from its obfuscation and inaccuracy was to blunt the jury’s proper sense of reluctance to act whilst what they might consider a reasonable doubt had not been removed.  In our opinion, the jury were not properly instructed as to the onus of proof.  For that reason alone there must be a new trial.  See Thomas v. The Queen ([1960] 102 CLR 584).” 28.  It is to be noted that whilst the court in Green v R stated this to be an appeal related to the ‘onus of proof’, it is clear that the issue which was addressed was the criminal standard of proof.  However, our attention was additionally drawn to other leading Australian cases on the standard of proof.  We were, amongst others, referred to R v Flesch & McKenzie [1986] 24 A.Crim.R. 290 where the Court of Criminal Appeal in New South Wales, when allowing the appeal, held that ordinarily it is desirable for trial judges to use the commonly recognised form of direction on proof beyond reasonable doubt, without development or analysis and that a lengthy development, which occurred in that case, will almost always lead to a situation where there is a risk that the jury will be left confused. 29.  In a much later case to which we were taken, R v Krasniqi [1993] 69 A.Crim.R. 383, the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal reviewed a number of earlier decisions on the point at issue, including R v Green, when concluding (at p. 391) that the summing up included an “undesirable elaboration on the burden of proof” but the court stated (at pp. 391-392): “…. the jury has not been directed to analyse doubt.  They were not carried past the point of reaching doubt.  The learned trial judge told the jury that fanciful or fantastic suppositions or possibilities are not doubts.  He did not postulate, or give the appearance of postulating, the existence of some doubt and tell the jury to decide whether the doubt was fanciful or fantastic.  He did not leave room for analysis in that sense.” 30.  The analysis of a doubt had occurred in R v Wilson & Ors [1986] 22 A.Crim.R. 130 where the trial judge had directed the jury (at p. 132): “If you think there is a doubt but that is merely a fanciful doubt, you will still convict because that is not a reasonable doubt: it is a doubt beyond reason”.  The Court of Criminal Appeal, South Australia, having considered R v Green (above) held by a majority that: “… the direction in the present case was radically defective.  It went further than merely to warn the jury against being influenced by fanciful or unreasonable possibilities or notions.  The judge said: ‘If you think there is a doubt but that it is merely a fanciful doubt, you will still convict because that is not a reasonable doubt.’  This direction postulates a doubt about guilt which the jury thinks exists.  It then invites them to subject their mental state to examination in order to determine whether the doubt about guilt which they think to exist, is to be characterised as fanciful or reasonable.  That direction is a negation of the proposition of which Green’s case is authority that the test of whether a doubt is reasonable is whether the jury entertains it in the circumstances.       I think that a direction in the terms given in the present case has a dangerous tendency to produce in the minds of the jurors an impression that a view held by them that there is a doubt about guilt is to be disregarded unless it passes some further test; that there must be some particular degree of doubt or even that a slight doubt is to be disregarded.  When jurors are invited to consider whether a doubt which they actually think to exist is fanciful, they may well interpret the invitation as one, not merely to exclude aberrant mental processes, but to put aside real doubts unless those doubts possess in their minds a certain degree of strength.  Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires that doubts, irrespective of degree of strength which they attain, be given effect to if the jurors, as reasonable persons, are prepared to entertain them.” 31.  Seen in isolation, it might be said that the judge in the present case had offended in the way which gave rise to criticism in R v Wilson and Ors.  Nevertheless, this is an aspect which, in our opinion, should be viewed in its full context.  We shall return to this in due course. 32.  In R v Goncalves [1997] A.Crim.R. 193, the Court of Criminal Appeal, Western Australia, dealt with an appeal which has relevance in the present context to the other words which are criticised in the summing up.  There, a trial judge had directed the jury that reasonable doubt was: “not proof to the point of absolute certainty.  It’s simply what the words say, ‘beyond reasonable doubt’”.  The court held, when dismissing the appeal, that whilst this was an undesirable direction, the remark in its proper context could not be said to have misled the jury.  Malcolm CJ (at p. 196) said:       “In my opinion, the direction in this case did not suffer from either of the vices in Green, although the elaboration of the point by the learned trial judge was clearly undesirable.  In my opinion, by saying that proof beyond reasonable doubt was not proof ‘to the point of absolute certainty’, the learned judge was telling the jury that proof beyond reasonable doubt did not mean proof beyond any doubt whatsoever.  From the way in which it was put, I am of the opinion that it remained for the jury to determine whether any doubt they had was a reasonable doubt.  In that sense, the direction excluded an approach which would have been wrong and emphasised to the jury that if they had any doubt they would have to determine whether it was reasonable.” 33.  Returning to the case presently before us, Mr Tam has at all times realistically accepted that the judge had commented on the standard of proof in ways which were, with respect, unwise.  This is borne out by the Specimen Directions issued to judges in this jurisdiction which sets out the model direction on the standard of proof in these terms: “How does the prosecution succeed in proving the defendant’s guilt?  The answer is – by making you sure of it.  Nothing less than that will do.  If after considering all the evidence you are sure that the defendant is guilty, you must return a verdict of ‘Guilty’.  If you are not sure, your verdict must be ‘Not Guilty’.” Attached to this direction is a helpful footnote which indicates that it is normally unnecessary to use the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, but that where counsel have adopted the phrase during the trial it is desirable to give the direction: “The prosecution must make you sure of guilt, which is the same as proving the case beyond reasonable doubt.” The point is also made in the same footnote that the Court of Appeal in England has cautioned against any attempt at a more elaborate definition of being ‘sure’ or of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. 34.  The modern position in England and Wales dates back to Walters v R [1969] 2 AC 26.  The developments on this topic since that time are well summarised in Archbold [2004] at paras. 4-384/5. 35.  In Hong Kong, Kempster JA, in R v Lee Yuk-wah & Ors, CACC 467/1984 (unreported), described a “plethora of applications” following the decision in R v Yeung Kuen-chi & Anor, CACC 266/1984 where this court held that the following direction was misleading and wrong: “There is a burden on the Crown to prove every element of these charges and the Crown must do so beyond (a) reasonable doubt.  It cannot do so to a hundred percent certainty.  This is not possible, but you must, in other words, be sure.” 36.  The judgment in Lee Yuk-wah & Ors, to which we were not unfortunately referred by counsel in argument, made reference to R v Ngan Chun-yee & Ors, CACC 137/1984, R v Wong Leung, CACC 517/1984 and R v Peter Li Kwok-sui & Anor, CACC 292/1984.  In all of those cases, it was, as Kempster JA said: “…. held that unfortunate elaborations by reference, for example, to ‘mathematical certainty’ not markedly different from that impugned in Yeung, had not, having regard to subsequent references to reasonable doubt, misled the relevant juries.” 37.  In Lee Yuk-wah & Ors, complaint was made about the direction given to the jury that they did not “have to be certain of a defendant’s guilt before you can convict him.  Few things are certain in this uncertain world and you can’t be certain in a mathematical sense in any case”.  The court accepted that, but for two decisions in the Privy Council, it was bound by the decision in Yeung Kuen-chi & Anor.  Those decisions arose from Walters v R (above) and Ferguson v R [1979] 1 All ER 877 and Kempster JA’s judgment deals with each of them in these terms: “7.    In Walters a direction referring to ‘absolute certainty’(which is) substantially similar to that complained of in the instant applications was upheld.  The word ‘absolute’ is no more than surplusage and no distinction is to be made between certainty and mathematical certainty.  In Ferguson Lord Scarman said at p. 882: ‘The time-honoured formula is that the jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.  As Dickson C.J. said in Dawson v. The Queen ([1961] 106 CLR 1) at p. 18, attempts to substitute other expressions have never prospered.  It is generally sufficient and safe to direct a jury that they must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt so that they feel sure of the defendant’s guilt.  Nevertheless other words will suffice so long as the message is clear.  In the present case the jury could have been under no illusion. The importance of being sure was repeatedly emphasized.’ Although Deputy Judge Hopkinson did not emphasize the importance of being sure he repeatedly stressed the importance of being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt which, to quote my lord Barker, J.A. in Yeung: ‘are simple English words and experience shows that juries are capable of understanding them without explanation.’ 8.    I am satisfied that the jury here was made well aware of the required standard of proof.  Nonetheless I would express the hope that all judges in this jurisdiction will heed the helpful guidance in relation to directions on the standard of proof to be found in Fergusonand in Yeung.” 38.  It was made clear in the concluding words of Lord Diplock’s judgment (at p. 31) in Walters v R (above), with which we respectfully agree, that it is “the effect of the summing up as a whole that matters”.  With these words in mind, Mr Tam reminded us that in numerous places during the summing up, the judge had correctly and succinctly dealt with the standard of proof.  We shall take some of these in turn. 39.  There were two passages shortly before the directions which are criticised.  When dealing with the burden of proof, the judge said: “I shall now remind you about a cardinal principle in criminal law, which I am sure you are now very familiar with because that has been repeated to you time and again by counsel, but it is my duty to repeat it to you again.  I have already mentioned that an accused is presumed innocent until the prosecution has satisfied you of his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.  This means firstly, the burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests upon the prosecution throughout the entire trial from beginning to end.  This burden never shifts.  There is no burden on the accused to prove anything, let alone his innocence.  Remember, it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused; the accused is not required to prove his innocence.”  (Appeal bundle p. 18) Then, immediately afterwards, when the judge was explaining that the applicants had no obligation to give evidence, he said: “…. they are presumed innocent unless the prosecution has satisfied you of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Appeal bundle p. 19) A little later, after the passage (cited above at paragraph 25) which was criticised, and, importantly, the passage which contains a model direction on the standard of proof and its impact on the approach the jury should take in the event that a reasonable doubt was raised, the judge said: “Does what defence counsel suggests in the totality of the evidence raise any reasonable doubt in your minds about the prosecution’s case.  In coming to that conclusion, I would remind you once again that you should apply your common-sense derived from your experience as men and women of this society.”  (Appeal bundle p. 20) Shortly afterwards, in the context of a ‘lies’ direction to which we shall have to return later under another ground of appeal, the judge said : “Convict him or her only if you are satisfied so that you are sure on the whole of the evidence, including what they said in their recorded interview, that he or she is guilty of the charge.”  (Appeal bundle p. 22) Later, when defining the elements of forgery the judge said : “… if you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the instruments are false, then you shall acquit the accused, not only of this count but also of all the other counts.”  (Appeal bundle p. 28) 40.  It is not without significance that experienced counsel who separately appeared at trial on behalf of D1 and D2 indicated no issues of any concern after the judge had enquired, at the end of the first day of his summing up, whether there were any matters they wished to raise. 41.  Perhaps in fairness to the judge, whilst in no sense is this to be taken as offering encouragement for the formula he chose to adopt in the passages which are criticised, it may be that he considered that the phraseology of D1’s trial counsel in his final speech called for something to be said over and above the usual direction given for the standard of proof beyond the words usually adopted to.  Counsel had said as follows: “You can’t say, ‘Well, she sounds guilty to me’ or ‘I think she’s guilty.’  It’s not enough.  You’ve got to be sure.  You’ve got to be able to walk out of this courtroom, having found her guilty, knowing that at no time in the future, in your life, will you ever ask yourself the question, ‘I wonder if she really was guilty.’  Because if you found her guilty and walked out of the court and at some later stage asked yourself that question, then you would not have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt when you found her guilty.”  (Appeal bundle p. 155) Similar phraseology was repeated by the same counsel later (at p. 169).  If these words triggered the judge’s decision to add to the specimen direction on the standard of proof, we do not, with respect, consider that they justified a departure from the usual direction. 42.  The impugned words used by the judge when he was giving the standard of proof directions have to be looked at in their full context.  We do not consider, in the present circumstances, that the judge’s direction that “a fanciful, stupid or ridiculous doubt” or his reference to proof not having to reach the standard of “mathematical certainty”, unwise though those words undoubtedly were, could have led to any confusion on the jury’s part.  It was made abundantly plain that the jury had to feel sure of guilt if they were to convict.  The offending words, which form no part of the normal directions given to juries on the standard of proof, were immediately followed by the exhortation that the jury should feel sure of guilt.  The jury were told that this was a very high standard and that unless they were sure of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, it was their duty to acquit.  The judge followed this by telling the jury in terms that suspicious circumstances or probable guilt were not enough.  43.  In the light of our conclusion, we do not need to dwell at any length with the further contentions made by Mr Grounds that a misdirection on the ‘standard of proof’ might also have affected the jury’s approach to the ‘inferences’ which might be drawn from the evidence or to the issue of dishonesty alleged against D2 in counts 3 and 4. 44.  All we need to say in regard to the ancillary submissions, which were effectively dependent on the principal ground succeeding, is that they added nothing of substance to the matters with which we have already dealt.  The judge went to considerable lengths to sum up the defence which had been presented to the jury without, of course, the benefit of evidence from either of the applicants.  Despite this, Mr Grounds submitted that D2 “may have stupidly believed or trusted his sister (D1) or there may have been an element of stupidity or ridiculousness or mathematical uncertainty involved which was capable of raising a doubt” in the jury’s approach to his defence and the issue of dishonesty.  There was, however, no hint or suggestion in the papers before us that D2 suffered from stupidity or anything approaching it and such considerations would have been entirely speculative. (2)     Lies 45.  Counsel for D1 and D2, as well as Mr Tam for the respondent, were agreed that a direction on ‘lies’ was not strictly required in present circumstances.  Counsel accepted that this was a case which fitted the position described in HKSAR v Mo Shiu-shing [1999] 1 HKC 43 at p. 57 where the judgment reads: “… where an allegation has simply been made against the defendant that he has been lying, this subject can be dealt with by the judge directing the jury in terms that this is an issue which relates solely to credibility, that is, that it is for the jury to decide whose evidence they believe.  In such circumstances, no more needs to be said.” For our part, we can well understand why the judge chose out of an abundance of caution to give a ‘lies’ direction in view of the gulf which lay between the prosecution and the defence.  Again, adopting the judgment in Mo Shiu-shing(at p. 57): “(2)   Where there is a danger that the jury may believe that lying goes to proof of guilt, usually because the prosecutor has alleged that the defendant has lied and has addressed the jury upon the basis that the lie is supportive of the prosecution case, a twofold warning should be given to the effect that:          (a)   lies can never prove guilt in themselves; and          (b)   that persons may lie for reasons other than guilt.          This last direction will need to be accompanied by the possible ‘innocent’ reasons that are usually given as examples in a standard direction as to why a person facing an allegation of crime might lie.” 46.  Nevertheless, it was submitted, as a further ground of appeal, that the judge, having decided to give a direction on lies, had misdirected the jury on that issue by leaving open the danger that the jury would misuse lies as evidence probative of guilt. 47.  The directions given by the judge about lies were in these terms: “You have seen the video interview of the two accused; they gave you an account of how the events happened.  If, having listened to the accused’s account in the video-recording, you come to the conclusion that he or she had at some stage told you lies, you must not convict him or her simply for that reason; because people tell lies for reasons other than that they are guilty.  Perhaps because they think the truth is unconvincing or out of confusion or out of panic or to protect someone else, or because they are ashamed of their behaviour that might fall short of committing a criminal offence. That is not an exhaustive list of reasons why people tell lies, but it may help you to understand more clearly that people do tell lies sometimes for reasons other than that they are guilty.  So, do not convict the accused simply because you think he was telling lies in the interview.  Convict him or her only if you are satisfied so that you are sure on the whole of the evidence including what they said in their recorded interview, that he or she is guilty of the charge.”  (Appeal bundle p. 22) 48.  The specific complaint made in this ground was that these directions did not go far enough.  The judge had not stated that lies in themselves could not prove guilt and he did not go on to say, in the suggested formula set out in Mo Shiu-shing (at p. 58): “If you think that there is, or may be, an innocent explanation for his lies then you should take no notice of them.  It is only if you are sure that he did not lie for an ‘innocent’ reason that his lies can be regarded by you as evidence which supports the prosecution’s case.” 49.  However, whilst the compliant as it stands may have some force, it cannot be viewed in isolation.  The jury were not pouring over the written words of the summing up to scrutinise under a spotlight every nuance of each stage as it proceeded.  They were able to hear the whole of the summing up before beginning their deliberations and, in the latter part of the summing up, the judge returned to this issue in a context where it was specifically relevant to the subject-matter with which he was dealing.  When referring to some of the answers D1 had given in her interview which prosecuting counsel had submitted were lies, the judge was at pains to remind the jury that even though they might find her to have been lying, this was not a sufficient reason to convict her.  He reminded the jury that lies might be told for reasons other than guilt and he said, for the first time, that lies could not in themselves prove guilt.  It was, in addition to the passages cited earlier in relation to the principal ground of appeal, emphasised again that the jury had to be satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt before they could convict. 50.  Mr Tam submitted that the ‘lies’ directions, taken overall, provided a clear message in circumstances where, at trial, counsel for D1 had alleged that Mr Lau and PW2 to PW5 had been lying while prosecuting counsel had said that the applicants had been lying in their interviews.  D2’s case was that he had relied on what he was told by D1.  The judge’s directions, it was submitted, removed the potential danger of the jury thinking that a defendant who had lied must be guilty. 51.  In the first of these later directions, as all counsel accepted, it was not entirely clear what the judge was meaning to say in relation to D1 albeit there appears, in our view, to have been nothing contained in the passage which was prejudicial to her.  The judge said: “I remind you what I said earlier.  Even though you find (D1) lying, that is not a sufficient reason to convict her, because a person may lie for reasons other than that she is guilty.  You have to be satisfied of her guilt beyond reasonable doubt before you could convict her.  Now, do the lies you find in the interview help you to remove any doubt, if what she said at the interview could be true?  This is a matter for you. (Counsel for D2) has taken you through the video interview of the 2nd accused.  The crux of his submission is that what the 2ndaccused said is consistent with what the 1st accused said in the interview.  Now, for that purpose, it does not matter if what the accused said in an interview was found to be untrue, because the defence of the 2nd accused was that he was acting on what he was told by the 1st accused.  So, that would not damage the 2nd accused’s case.”  (Appeal bundle p. 75) Later, again, when the judge was itemising areas of dispute, he said: “… Now, I remind you what I said earlier about lies; lies can never prove guilt in themselves, and that persons may lie for reasons other than (that) they are guilty. …”  (Appeal bundle p. 79) As we have already said, the judge had in fact omitted to say earlier that lies could not in themselves prove guilt.  In this sense it was not a ‘reminder’, but the judge went on later to say: “… As against the 1st accused, you have the evidence of the lies she told about the documents and how they came to be created.  Again, I remind you that lies can never prove guilt and a person may lie for reasons other than she is guilty.  So, ask yourselves whether in the light of all the circumstances, she knew the documents were forgeries. Again, the 2nd accused, he has not been shown to have told you lies about how the documents came to be created.  He stated that he did not know, he has no knowledge.  So, ask yourselves whether in the light of the circumstances, he knew the documents were forger(ies). …”   (Appeal bundle p. 81) 52.  We consider that the directions given by the judge were adequate in all the circumstances.  Nothing more needed to be said and, to answer the point raised in this ground, nothing, in our opinion, was said by the judge which could have led the jury to infer guilt merely from lies. (3)     Dishonesty 53.  The next ground of appeal with which we shall deal impugned the judge’s directions on dishonesty by, amongst other things, “muddling” the defences of D1 and D2 and, in D2’s case, by directing the jury that they did not have to consider the second question in Ghosh when determining whether D2 had acted dishonestly.  54.  The judge, on the issue of dishonesty, had directed the jury as follows: “Thirdly, dishonesty.  On this issue you have to decide two questions.  Firstly, was what the accused did or agreed to do, dishonest by the standard of reasonable and honest people?  In this regard you, the jury, must form your own judgment of what those standards are.  That is why you are called from your various inconveniences to come here to apply your everyday experience as reasonable members of the public and to exercise common-sense. The second question is, must the accused themselves have realised that what they were doing or agreed to do would be regarded as dishonest by reasonable and honest people?  In deciding this question, you must consider the accused own state of mind as at the time of the event.  And counsel has reminded you the background that is, in February 1999.  Counsel says (D1) acted under the spell of the master, and counsel says (D2) acted on the trust of the sister.  This is something that you may consider. This question has both a subjective and an objective element in it.  It is not simply whether the accused themselves realised what they were doing was dishonest, it is not simply that.  It is not simply whether under the spell of the master they did not realise what they were doing was dishonest.  It is this; it is whether they must have realised that what they were doing or agreed to do, would be regarded as dishonest by reasonable and honest people.       So, I repeat, it is whether they must have realised what they were doing or agreed to do, would be regarded as dishonest by reasonable and honest people.  I shall come back to this and give you more specific directions on the facts when I sum up the evidence to you in due course.”  (Appeal bundle pp. 32-33) 55.  In this passage, it is plain that the judge’s reference to “they”, meaning both applicants, had been under Master Yi’s spell was a slip of the tongue.  It was no doubt caused by the difficulty which had arisen, that D1, by virtue of her defence that she was acting under the spell of Master Yi, was entitled to a Ghosh direction whereas D2, who merely said that he honestly relied on his sister’s word, was not so entitled.  56.  As Mr Tam submitted, a fair reading of the passage shows that the judge was directing the jury that they had to decide two questions on the issue of dishonesty.  These arose from the two limbs of the well-known test in R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053 at 1064.  When the judge returned to this issue, he said: “I have told you that (the) prosecution must prove that what the accused have agreed to do was dishonest and you must decide two questions; firstly, was that the accused did by the standard of reasonable and honest people, dishonest?  Now, you the jury must form your own judgment of what those standards are.  As reasonable men and women of society, you must know what those standards are, apply those standards to the facts of this case as you found them, ask yourselves whether what the accused did was dishonest by the standard of reasonable and honest people; not by their own standard, by the standard of reasonable and honest people.  Was it dishonest to present Exhibit P4 and P5 to the bank as IWM’s board meeting minutes and shareholders’ resolution when no such meeting had been held and no such resolution has been passed?  This is a question for you. If the answer is ‘Yes’, then the next question to consider is, must the accused themselves have realised that what they were doing or agreed to do – we are just concerned with what they were doing – would be regarded as dishonest by reasonable and honest people.  Now, this question has both a subjective and an objective element in it.  It is not simply whether the accused themselves thought that they were honest in so doing.  It is whether they realised reasonable and honest people would regard it as dishonest to present those documents when there was no such board meeting held and when there was no such resolution passed. Counsel rightly asked you to take into account the accused’s state of mind as at February 1999.  For (D1), counsel said that she was acting under the spell of the master.  Do you find that to be true or could possibly be true?  If ‘Yes’, would she, while under that spell, consider it not dishonest to do what you found she did; that is, to present those documents as if there were board meetings and resolutions passed when in fact there was no.       Of course, if you do not find that she was acting under the spell of the master, then there is no need to ask yourselves this second question.  You only ask this question if you think that she might be acting under the spell of the master.       For (D2), his position is different.  He was not acting under the influence of the master.  He was not a believer.  He acted on the trust of his sister.  Perhaps there is really no need for you to consider this second question.”  (Appeal bundle pp. 82-83) 57.  In our judgment, the judge had dealt with this matter in a sensible fashion, having tailored his directions to the somewhat awkward situation which had arisen.  It is apparent that he had not confused the separate nature of the cases presented by D1 and D2.  All that we need to say on this issue is that in D1’s case, the Ghosh direction was a model of its kind and would not have been required in all probability if her defence had been presented on a different footing.  So far as D2 was concerned, whilst it may be said that the judge was somewhat generous in giving D2 the benefit of a partial Ghosh direction, the fact is that as the jury had to be given such a direction in D1’s case, it was impractical to tell the jury wholly to ignore it in D2’s case.  (4)    Admitted facts 58.  Amongst the ‘Admitted Facts’ which trial counsel for both applicants and counsel for the prosecution had signed under section 65C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221, was the following: “17.    On 26th July 2001 an agreement between IWM, Tacglory and P&T dated 12th January 1999 was found at Flat D, 6/F., 24-28 Yik Yam Street, Happy Valley, the home of D1, by the ICAC following a search of the premises.  The agreement is produced as exhibit P54.”  (Appeal bundle p. 13) 59.  Mr Grounds, in a further ground of appeal, raised a matter which was never raised at trial and should never have been raised as a serious point in these proceedings.  He alleged that as Exhibit P. 54 was a “mere sham” the exhibit should have been referred to as a document.  To have referred to this as an “agreement” meant, he suggested, that the prosecution was bound by their admission that this was an agreement (as opposed to a sham). 60.  We do not propose to say more on this point than that a careful draftsman would no doubt have described Exhibit P. 54 as a “document described as an agreement”.  However, no one at trial was under any misapprehension about it nor could they reasonably have been. (5)    Alternative basis of defence 61.  In the final ground to which we need to make reference, it was submitted that the judge had failed to put to the jury a possible alternative basis on which the defence might be viewed.  It was accepted in these proceedings that neither of the highly experienced counsel at trial had put forward any alternative basis for the defence but Mr Poon, for D1, argued at some length that the evidence had left an alternative defence open which the judge ought, in the proper exercise of his duty, to have explained to the jury. 62.  The ‘alternative defence’ which Mr Poon had in mind was that D1 may have believed that the other Hong Kong disciples would not have objected to the application for a mortgage on the Property, even though their consent was not sought or obtained, “as she had been instructed to act in this way by Master Yi …… D1 may also have believed that they would not have questioned her evenif she had just typed in the mortgages unilaterally”. 63.  The respondent’s submission that there was no evidence in the court below to raise these issues is well-founded.  There was no evidence of any kind to suggest that D1 might have believed that she was entitled to make use of false documents in order to deceive a bank into granting credit facilities to her or her brother’s companies.  Mr Poon, despite repeated requests to indicate any material from which such a defence might spring, was unable to do so. Conclusion (convictions) 64.  Having regard to the matters raised under the principal ground of appeal in relation to the standard of proof, we shall grant leave.  However, treating the hearing in each case as the appeal of D1 and D2, we dismiss their appeals against conviction. Sentence 65.  There remains for our consideration an application for leave to appeal against the sentence of eleven years’ imprisonment imposed on D1.  No complaint was raised in relation to the additional order that she should be disqualified for fifteen years from acting as a director of a company under section 168E of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32, and this order will stand. 66.  The judge, when sentencing, correctly described D1 and D2 as having carried out a carefully planned fraud which had taken nearly two years to materialise.  In early 1997, D1 and D2 arranged banking officers to view the Property on the pretext of raising a loan for IWM and later at the end of 1998 the Property was provided as security for credit facilities to Tacglory and PTM.  The judge found that this was an elaborate fraud in which false corporate and banking documents were created and used to mortgage the Property of the religious body to which D1 belonged.  The value of the Property was large and the Bank stood to lose a sizeable sum of money as the result of the fraud.  $35 million was owed by Tacglory and another $58 million was owed by PTM to the Bank.  D1 had shown no remorse for her wrongdoing, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against her. 67.  These offences, as the judge commented, amounted not only to a fraud on the Bank but on IWM also.  By their conduct, D1 and D2 had fraudulently mortgaged the Property.  This had the effect of putting the interests of IWM at serious risk and deceiving the Bank into providing credit facilities which, in the event, resulted in the Bank sustaining substantial losses.  Even on D1’s case, the mortgages were for $40 million. 68.  We are asked to view this matter in effect as a fraud amounting to $40 million.  As there has been no resolution so far to civil proceedings which are in progress, we propose, as the judge appears also to have done, to deal with the case on this basis. 69.  Bearing in mind that D2 received a sentence of seven and a half years’ imprisonment, it was argued that this left a considerable disparity between his sentence and D1’s.  Mr Poon submitted that whilst D1 may have made the whole venture possible and was deserving of a sentence no less than seven and a half years, a three-and-a-half-year difference between her sentence and that of her brother (D2) was too great. 70.  We consider that this is a case which can properly be looked at as a whole.  While there were four counts, the two sets of forged documents were used to obtain the two mortgage loans amounting to approximately $40 million.  Had this been a single charge of theft of $40 million, which in effect this is, the sentence could have been no more than the statutory maximum of ten years for theft.  71.  This was, so far as IWM was concerned, a considerable breach of trust on the part of D1.  She was a shareholder and director who, behind the backs of the others, mortgaged the Property which was being held in trust for Mr Lau.  This provides an aggravating factor which alone justified the judge in taking a much more serious view of D1’s role.  Furthermore, as the judge remarked, D1 was the majority shareholder of Tacglory and must have stood to gain substantially from the fraud. 72.  We derived little assistance from the large number of previous decisions of this count in other cases where large sums of money have been taken dishonestly by a variety of means.  There are no guidelines for sentencing purposes and each case must be decided on its own facts.  Having regard to the grave breach of her fiduciary duty towards the other shareholders and directors of IWM, and remembering that there has been no hint of remorse and no attempt to repay any part of the loss, we consider that a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was appropriate for the criminality involved in D1’s conduct.  In saying this, we are satisfied that a sentence of 11 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive. 73.  Accordingly, we shall give leave and treating the hearing as the appeal, we allow the appeal to the extent that D1’s sentence is reduced by two years to nine years’ imprisonment on counts 1 and 2.  The concurrent sentences of six years’ imprisonment on counts 3 and 4 will remain.  All these sentences are to run concurrently, making nine years in all. (M. Stuart-Moore) (Frank Stock) (Michael Lunn) Vice-President Justice of Appeal Judge of the Court of First Instance 　 　   Mr Simon Tam, SGC, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent. Mr Albert Poon and Mr Vincent Poon, instructed by Messrs K.Y. Woo & Co.,  for D1/Applicant. Mr Christopher Grounds and Ms Lydia L.K. Sun, instructed by Messrs Chiu, Szeto & Cheng, for D2/Applicant.